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PUBLIC UTILITIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING AND DEREGULATION
AND LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES
James W. Moeller*
INTRODUCTION

Thirty years ago, Potomac Electric Power Company ("PEPCO") sold electric power generated
by coal-burning power plants located in the Washington region. Today, PEPCO can sell electric
power generated by coal-burning and nuclear power plants located in West Virginia, Pennsylvania,
and Illinois. By importing electric power from those states, PEPCO can, in effect, export to those
states the environmental impact of coal-burning and nuclear power plants that generate power for
affluent PEPCO consumers in the District of Columbia and Maryland.
This "outsourcing" of electric power generation was made possible by seismic changes in the
structure of the electric utility industry wrought by Congress and by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC") in the last three decades. The purpose of those changes was to replace
regulation with competition in wholesale markets for electric power.
Replacing power plants in our "backyard" with plants in someone else's "backyard" raises
issues of environmental justice. Because PEPCO already has outsourced power production to other
states, it has established a precedent for high-income communities to outsource power production
to communities where, in the words of a Pennsylvania public utility commissioner, it "may be
more palatable." Specifically, high-income communities can now outsource power production to
low-income communities.
However, the consequences of outsourcing power production have not been studied, analyzed
or quantified. Executive Order 12,898, signed by President Clinton in 1994, requires federal
agencies to address federal actions that may have disproportionate environmental consequences
for low-income communities. FERC, however, insists that it is not subject to the executive order
because it is an independent agency. Thus, the environmental impact of electric utility restructuring
and deregulation has been ignored.
The environmental consequences of power production outsourcing on low-income
communities must be studied, analyzed, and quantified. Under Executive Order No. 12,898, FERC
must assess and, if possible, mitigate those consequences. FERC cannot ignore its mandated
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responsibility to assess the environmental impact of electric power restructuring and deregulation
on low-income communities.
Part I of this article will describe the restructuring and deregulation of the electric power
industry in the last thirty years. Part II will discuss the environmental consequences of that
restructuring and deregulation in terms of the impact of those consequences on low-income
communities. Those consequences will be explored in the context of two recent developments in
the Washington region: the closure of the Potomac River Generating Station in 2012, and the
acquisition of PEPCO by Chicago-based Exelon Corporation ("Exelon") in 2015.
PART I: ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING AND DEREGULATION

In response to the Great Depression, Congress established the traditional structure of the
electric utility industry through the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 ("PUHCA").1 In
1977, in response to the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973, Congress began a decades-long effort to revise
that structure.2 Soon thereafter, and to promote a competitive electric utility industry, FERC began
a gradual deregulation of electric generation that traditionally had been regulated through cost-ofservice ratemaking 3 To fulfill the promise of competitive electric power markets, FERC also
required "open access" to transmission facilities.4
A.

TraditionalElectric Utility Industry Structure

For seventy years, the fundamental structure of the electric utility industry remained
unchanged. Congress imposed that structure on the industry through PUHCA.5 PUHCA was
enforced by the Office of Public Utility Regulation within the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)., PUHCA "gave the SEC power to refashion the structure and the business
practices of an entire industry. Except in wartime, the federal government never before assumed
such total control over any industry."
Since their inception in the late 19th century, electric utilities were small, vertically-integrated
companies that owned and operated assets for the generation, transmission and distribution of

Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (repealed 2005).

2 Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7131 (1977).
See, e.g., Refinements to Policies and Procedures for Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric
Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 67,055, 67,057 (Oct. 30, 2015) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by
Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,689.
See, e.g., DIv. OF INv. MGMT., U.S. SEC. &ExCH. COMM'N, THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING
COMPANIES (1995).
6

Id.
Id
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electricity.8 Over the course of the early 20th century, there was considerable consolidation in the
electric utility industry by public utility holding companies, each of which acquired numerous
electric utilities throughout the U.S. 9 In 1930, just nineteen holding companies controlled ninety
percent of the electric utilities in the U.S. 10
Section 11 of PUHCA restricted holding companies to ownership of multiple electric utilities
comprising single integrated electric utility systems." A holding company could own several
electric utilities, but those utilities had to be economically integrated and geographically
contiguous. 12 As a trust-busting statute, Section 11 of PUHCA required several holding companies
to divest far-flung unintegrated and non-contiguous electric utility subsidiaries." The
constitutionality of the statute was challenged legally but upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.14

-

The requirement for utility companies to be economically integrated and geographically
contiguous defined the structure of the electric utility industry for seventy years." For example, in
1990, the public utility holding company Energy Corporation owned four electric utilities
Arkansas Power &Light Co., Louisiana Power &Light Co., Mississippi Power &Light Co., and
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. - all geographically contiguous and all economically
integrated.16 Under Section 11 of PUHCA, therefore, Exelon in Chicago could not own PEPCO in
the District of Columbia. " Separated by Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Indiana, the city of
Chicago and the District of Columbia are hardly geographically contiguous.
PUHCA defined the structure of the electric utility industry in other respects as well." For
example, the statute also limited the diversification of public utility holding companies into
businesses unrelated to electric generation, transmission and distribution.19 Holding company
diversification was limited to "such other businesses as are reasonably incidental, or economically

I U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0562(00), THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 2000: AN UPDATE 1 (2000).
' U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0563, PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY
ACT OF 1935: 1935-1992 6 (1993).
1115

12

Id.

U.S.C. § 79k (repealed 2005).

13Id
14 N. Am. Co. v. Sec. &Exch. Comm'n, 327 U.S. 686 (1945) (holding that PUHCA did not violate
the Due
Process Clause of the 5' Amendment and that Congress had constitutional power to reorganize holding company
structures and the Supreme Court could not question the appropriateness or propriety of Congress' decision); see also
Elec. Bond and Share Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 303 U.S. 419 (1938) (holding PUHCA provision that denied
companies, who failed to register, from engaging in certain activities in interstate commerce did not violate any
constitutional provisions).
15 See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT
OF 1935: 1935-1992 74 (1993).
16 Id.
17 15 U.S.C. § 79k (repealed 2005).
18 Id.

19 Id.
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necessary or appropriate to" the operation of electric utilities.2 0 Holding companies could own
construction companies for the construction of power plants but could not own, for example,
airlnes. 21
B.

TraditionalElectric Utility Regulation andRatemaking

It is well established that electric utilities are legal monopolies. 22 They are granted exclusive
franchises by state public service commissions to provide electricity within designated service
territories.23 For example, PEPCO is the only electric utility authorized to provide electric service
within the District of Columbia and its Maryland suburbs. 24 The franchise to provide electric
service within those suburbs was granted by the Maryland state legislature in 1900.25
Because they are legal monopolies, the rates charged by electric utilities for services are
regulated. Under Part II of the Federal Power Act, enacted in 1935, FERC regulates the rates for
wholesale sales of electricity and for transmission services. 27 Under state statutes, state public
service commissions regulate the rates for retail sales of electricity and for distribution services.2
For example, under its organic statute, the District of Columbia Public Service Commission
regulates the rates for retail sales and distribution of electricity by Exelon within the District of
Columbia.29

FERC and the states regulate those rates through cost-of-service ratemaking.3 1 Such
ratemaking results in cost-based rates for transmission and distribution services.31 Under cost-ofservice ratemaking, FERC and the states determine the prices electric utilities will be permitted to
charge for electric services based on the costs incurred by those utilities in providing those

20
21
22

15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(1) (repealed 2005).
Id.
See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, The Regulation ofNaturalMonopolies, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW &ECON. 1227-

1348 (2007).
23
24

Id.
Id.

25363 Md. Laws 1900, ch. 245 (granting Great Falls Power Company a franchise). PEPCO was the successor
in interest and franchise was transferred to PEPCO in 1947.
26 See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ENERGY ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 20-21 (2009) (the basis for

regulation).

27 16 U.S.C.
21
29

§ 824 (2015), et seq.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 34-911 (2001).
Id.

3o See, e.g., JAMES H. MCGRAW, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 179-86 (2009) (discussing
traditional ratemaking); see also LEONARD SAUL GOODMAN, THE PROCESS OF RATEMAKING 279-80 (discussing cost

of service and general principles).
31 MCGRAW, supranote 30, at 180 ("The Commission must then establish rates ... based on the jurisdictional
cost of service.").
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services. 32 The utilities are allowed to recover their costs as well as a reasonable profit the precise
percentage of which also is determined by FERC and the states.33
Thus, through ratemaking proceedings, FERC would determine the prices that electric utilities
could charge for sales of electricity based on the costs incurred by those utilities in generating that
electricity. 34 Those costs would include the costs of building and operating power plants, as well
as the costs of fuel for those plants, e.g., the price of coal.35 It also would determine the prices that
utilities could charge for transmission services based on the costs of providing those services.
Those costs would include the costs of building and maintaining transmission lines.36
Traditional cost-of-service ratemaking has changed little since FERC began to regulate the
rates charged by electric utilities in 1935. Indeed, state ratemaking has changed little since the
inception of electric utilities in the late 19th century. The states continue to use such ratemaking
to regulate the rates for retail sales of electricity and for distribution services, and FERC continues
to use cost-of-service ratemaking to regulate the rates for transmission services.37
In tandem, however, with congressional restructuring of the electric utility industry, FERC
began in the 1980s to deregulate rates for wholesale sales of electricity. The deregulation of those
rates has facilitated the outsourcing of power production; 39 the environmental impact of such
outsourcing on low-income communities has yet to be analyzed.
C.

CongressionalElectric Utility Industry Restructuring

Following the Arab Oil Embargo and ensuing energy crisis of the early 1970s, Congress began
a decades-long effort to restructure and deregulate the electric utility industry and to formulate a
comprehensive national energy policy. 40 In 1977, Congress enacted the Department of Energy
Organization Act.41 That legislation established the cabinet-level Department of Energy
("DOE"). 42 In addition, the Federal Power Commission ("FPC"), established in 1920 to license
hydroelectric power plants, 43 became FERC.44
32 McGRAW, supra note 30, at 102.

3 Id.
3 Id.
3 Id.
36

Id.

Id.
See, e.g., Refinements to Policies and Procedures for Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric
Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 67,055, 67,057 (Oct. 30, 2015) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
3 Id.
4' Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565, 42 U.S.C. § 7131 (1977).
3
3'

41
42
4

Id.
Id.

Federal Water Power Act, Pub. L. No. 66-280, 41 Stat. 1043 (1920) (now Part I of the Federal Power Act).
U.S.C. § 7134 (2012).

4442

5

In 1978, Congress enacted the National Energy Act45, which was actually comprised of five
separate pieces of legislation: the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 6 the Energy Tax Act,47

the National Energy Conservation Policy Act,48 the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act,49 and

the Natural Gas Policy Act.5 o Relative to the electric utility industry, the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act ("PURPA") amended Part II of the Federal Power Act to allow non-utilities not
subject to FERC regulation to generate electricity through small power production and
cogeneration. 1 Moreover, it required electric utilities to purchase that electricity. The policy
behind PURPA was to encourage additional generation of electricity by non-traditional facilities
that would not be subject to cumbersome FERC cost-of-service ratemaking.
Thus FERC, under PURPA, would not regulate the rates for electric power generated and sold
by non-traditional facilities, which could be either small power production facilities or
cogeneration facilities. 54 By definition, those facilities would not be electric utilities subject to
regulation under Part II of the Federal Power Act.5 Small power production facilities generate
electric power from non-traditional power plant fuels, such as biomass and methane. Typically
located at industrial facilities, cogeneration plants generate steam used in industrial processes. That
steam can then be used for power production as well.
Fourteen years later, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 1992 ("EPACT 1992").56 The
legislation amended PUHCA to exempt from regulation companies that owned power plants but
not transmission or distribution facilities.57 Whereas power plants were once built by verticallyintegrated public utilities with generation, transmission, and distribution, now power plants could
be built by generation-only companies.58 Those generation-only companies, known as independent
power producers that build so-called "merchant" power plants, would compete with traditional
vertically-integrated utilities for sales of electric power.

National Energy Act of 1978, H.R.8444, 95th Congress (1978).
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978).
4 Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978).
4' National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206 (1978).
4 Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (1978).
" Natural Gas Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978).
5116 U.S.C. §§ 796(17), 796(18), 824a-3 (2012).
52 Id. § 824a-3(a)(2).
5 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978).
5 Id.
5516 U.S.C. §§ 796(17), 796(18), 824a-3 (2012).
56 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
5 Id. § 711, 106 Stat. at 2905 (section 711 added Section 32 to PUHCA. 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5a).
58 Id.
4
46
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Relative to the electric utility industry, EPACT 1992 also specifically authorized U.S. public
utilities, for the first time, to acquire public utilities overseas.59 The legislation implemented a
revised comprehensive national energy policy as well as restructured the electric utility industry
per se.60 As such, EPACT 1992 also addressed energy conservation,61 electric motor vehicles, 62
renewable energy, coal power, and clean coal.64
Finally, in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ("EPACT 2005"),65 Congress repealed PUHCA.66
Public utility holding companies could now own electric utilities not economically integrated or
geographically contiguous. 6' The repeal of PUHCA was intended to promote mergers and
acquisitions that presumably would bring efficiencies to the industry. Indeed, the repeal unleashed
a torrent of electric utility mergers and acquisitions. In 2000, EIA reported that "[m]ergers,
acquisitions, and divestitures of power plants have become widespread as [electric] utilities ...
seek to improve their positions in the increasingly competitive electric power industry. Since 1992,
[electric utilities] have been involved in 35 mergers, and an additional 12 mergers are pending
approval."
The repeal of PUHCA allowed Chicago-based Exelon to acquire Baltimore Gas &Electric Co.
in 2012 and, significantly, to acquire PEPCO in 2015.69 Under PUHCA, Exelon could not have
owned and operated PEPCO because Chicago and the District are not geographically contiguous.
The acquisition of PEPCO by Exelon following the repeal of PUHCA has allowed PEPCO to
outsource the generation of electric power for its consumers in the District and the Maryland
suburbs.
In addition, EPACT 2005 provided for the modernization and expansion of the interstate
electric transmission grid.70 The interstate electric transmission grid is the complex web of highvoltage electric transmission lines that connect all of the electric utilities in the U.S. and that allow
electric power to be transmitted anywhere in the U.S. High-voltage transmission lines, often seen
hanging from tall steel towers along interstate highways, are distinct from the small-voltage

5 Id. § 715, 106 Stat. at 2912 (section 715 added Section 33 to PUHCA. 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5b). See also, James
W. Moeller, U.S. Investment in Foreign Utilities Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and the
Energy Policy Act of 1992, 24 LAW &POL'Y ININT'L BuS. 503 (1993).
6o Id.
61 Id. tit. 1, 106 Stat. at 2782.
62 Id. tit. VI, 106 Stat. at 2899.
63 Id. tit. XII, 106 Stat. at 2956.
64 Id. tit. XIII, 106 Stat. at 2970.
65 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
66 Id. § 1263, 119 Stat. at 974.

67

Id.

U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0562(00), THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 2000: AN UPDATE 1 (2000).
61 Jaime Smith Hopkins, BGEparentcompany to acquireD.C.-basedPepco,THE BALTIMORE SUN (Apr. 30,
68

7:45 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-exelon-pepco-20140430-story.html.
7o See generally 119 Stat. at 941.
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distribution lines that bring power to our homes and businesses." To modernize and expand the
interstate electric transmission grid, EPACT 2005 provided for the adoption of reliability standards
for the grid, 2 established a process for siting interstate transmission lines, 3 and authorized FERC
to revise cost-of-service ratemaking to provide financial incentives for the construction of new
transmission. 74
EPACT 2005 enacted the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005 ("PUHCA 2005"),75
which simply authorized FERC to audit the books of public utility holding companies. 76 Thus,
PUHCA 2005 bore little resemblance to its predecessor. Additionally, through repeal of Section
11 of PUHCA, EPACT 2005 significantly restructured the electric utility industry, which had
remained largely unchanged for seventy years.77 Like EPACT 1992, EPACT 2005 restructured the
electric utility industry and implemented a revised comprehensive national energy policy. For
example, the legislation also addressed energy efficiency, 78 renewable energy,79 coal,o and
research and development
Congressional restructuring of the electric utility industry, intended to deregulate and promote
competition within the industry, provided a foundation upon which FERC could also deregulate
and promote competition. FERC focused its efforts, however, specifically on electric generation
and on markets for wholesale sales of electric power rather than electric transmission. FERC
continues to regulate this, and not on electric distribution, which the states regulate.82
D.

FERCDeregulationofElectric Generation

Congress gradually restructured, deregulated, and promoted competition in the electric utility
industry by, for example, promoting merchant power plants to compete with traditional vertically

Perhaps

page

11
of
this
source
I
found
through
google?
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/12/f28/united-states-electricity-industry-primer.pdf
72 Id. § 1211, § 215, 119 Stat. at 941-43.
n Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1221, § 216, 119 Stat. 594,946; see generally James W.
Moeller, Interstate Electric Transmission Lines and States'Rights in the Mid-Atlantic Region, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REv. 77(2013).
7 Id. § 1241, § 219, 119 Stat. at 961.
7 Id. 119 Stat. at 972.
76 See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. § 366.2 (2005).
7 See THE REPEAL OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935 (PUHCA 1935) AND ITS
IMPACT ON ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES, CONG. RES. SERV. (Nov 20, 2006), available at
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20061120_RL33739_19b253dllf6560b7153533b0430al57fe0effb5fpdf.
7 119 Stat. at 605.
7 Id.
71

80 Id.
81 Id.

See generally Refinements to Policies and Procedures for Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of
Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 67,055, 67,057 (Oct. 30, 2015) (to
be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
82
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integrated utilities for sales of electric power. In the meantime, FERC specifically deregulated
prices for electricity sold at wholesale in interstate commerce.
Traditionally, FERC regulated the rates for wholesale sales of electricity in interstate
commerce as well as transmission services through cost-of-service ratemaking. This ratemaking
resulted in cost-based rates for electricity. In the 1980s, FERC began to authorize market-based
rates for wholesale sales of electricity in interstate commerce. In contrast to cost-based rates,
market-based rates are determined in competitive markets and not through ratemaking proceedings
before FERC. Ratemaking proceedings, which consume substantial administrative resources and
involve considerable transactions costs, result in rates that reflect the cost of electric power but
that do not reflect the actual market value of that power. Rates that do not reflect actual market
value undermine the fundamental principles of free enterprise.
In the 1980s, prior to the enactment of EPACT 1992, FERC began to permit market-based
rates on a case-by-case basis.8 3 FERC recognized that "the cost-based pricing concept is the
antithesis of the objective of promoting competitive wholesale power markets." 84 FERC
authorized market-based rates when the seller could demonstrate, in an antitrust-style economic
analysis, that it lacked market power in generation (horizontal market power) and in transmission
(vertical market power).8 " Such an analysis could be relatively simple for a generation-only
company with no transmission facilities.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration explained in its 1993 report on PUHCA that "[t]o
overcome the limitations of cost-based pricing, in the mid-1980s FERC considered thirty-one
applications to use market-based pricing for wholesale transactions, although only a few
applications were approved. However, by the mid-1990s, FERC had approved the use of marketbased rates for more than 100 power suppliers, and substantial growth in their use had begun." 86
In 2008, FERC clarified and codified its market-based rates policy.87
Given the growth of merchant power plants with market-based rates, traditional, verticallyintegrated electric utilities had no need to generate their own power. Franchised electric utilities
could purchase wholesale electric power from generation-only companies (or, for that matter, from
vertically-integrated electric utilities with surplus generation) and sell the electric power at retail
to the consumers in their service territories.

8

See, e.g., Refinements to Policies and Procedures for Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric

Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 67,055, 67,057 (Oct. 30, 2015) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
84
8
86

U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 8, at 63.

See 18 C.F.R. § 35.37.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0562(00), THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF

THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 2000: AN UPDATE 1 (2000).

Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public
Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,342 (March 25, 2010) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
87

9

Indeed, those traditional electric utilities could now sell their generation and become
transmission and distribution utilities, or "wires-only" utilities. According to the Energy
Information Administration (EIA) within DOE, in 2000, electric utilities were "divesting power
generation assets in unprecedented numbers. Since late 1997, [electric utilities] collectively have
divested or are in the process of divesting 156.5 gigawatts of power generation capacity,
representing about twenty-two percent of total U.S. electric utility generation capacity."" In 2000,
consistent with this restructuring within the electric utility industry, PEPCO itself sold four of its
power plants. 89

Market-based rates for generation-only companies with merchant power plants represented a
significant step toward deregulation of wholesale markets for electric power. Those companies
would not be subject to the costs and rigors associated with cumbersome ratemaking proceedings
before FERC (although "wires-only" utilities would still be subject to such ratemaking before
FERC and state commissions). 90 Those ratemaking proceedings, moreover, result in rates that do
not reflect the actual market value of electric power and thus, under conventional economic
theories of free enterprise, could result in an inefficient allocation of electric power. 91
Of course, an efficient allocation of electric power needed more than just market-based rates.
To fulfill the promise of competition in wholesale markets for electric power, additional FERC
action was needed.
E.

MerchantPlants, Electric Transmission, and "Open Access"

Apart from exempting independent power producers from the rigors of cost-based ratemaking,
FERC undertook measures to ensure that those producers were able to get their product to market.
Those measures fulfilled the promise of competition in wholesale markets for electric power.
The purchase of power from an independent power producer ("IPP") by a franchised electric
utility with customers to serve would be impossible if the utility was unable to import the power
to those customers. To import that power, the utility might require the use of transmission facilities
owned by a vertically-integrated electric utility with transmission assets. If the verticallyintegrated electric utility was competing with the IPP for sales of electric power, then use of the
transmission facilities would be denied.
To fulfill the promise of competition in wholesale markets for electric power, FERC adopted
Order No. 888.92 Order No. 888 required transmission-owning electric utilities to permit
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 8, at xi.

Dana Hedgpeth, PEPCO to Sell FourPowerPlants, WASH. POST, June 9, 2000, at E4.
o See Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public
Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,342 (Mar. 25, 2010) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
92 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by
Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,688, 64,689
10

independent power producers and other electric utilities to use those transmission assets to transact
electric power sales.93 In other words, the order required "open access" to transmission assets.
Thus, a franchised electric utility in Maryland, for example, could purchase electric power from
an IPP in West Virginia. The power would then be transmitted over transmission facilities, owned
by a third-party, vertically-integrated electric utility, to the Maryland utility.
To ensure that the third party did not discriminate against the IPP or the Maryland utility,
FERC adopted Order No. 2000 in 1999.94 Under that rule, the third party would continue to own
its transmission facilities which would, however, be operated by an independent entity: a so-called
regional transmission operator ("RTO") or independent system operator ("ISO")95 The RTO or
ISO would operate all of the transmission facilities for numerous vertically-integrated utilities
within a large geographic region (i.e. the Mid-Atlantic region). 96 Thus, by adopting Order No.

2000, FERC encouraged the creation of independent system operators for transmission assets.
Currently, there are six regional ISOs in the continental U.S. In the Mid-Atlantic region,
transmission assets in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and parts of ten other states, as well
as in the District, are operated by PJM Interconnection, Inc. ("PJM").97 PJM also includes
northeastern Illinois,98 where most of Chicago-based Exelon's nuclear power plants are located. 99
Some of those ISOs also operate markets for electricity needed on short notice. For example,
if the weather turns particularly warm and consumers turn on their air conditioners, the franchised
utility that serves those customers must purchase more electric power on short notice. It can do so
in the markets operated by the organizations. FERC adopted rules for the operation of those
markets in 2008.100
In 2007, twenty years after FERC adopted Order No. 888, it adopted Order No. 890, which
reformed and improved the "open access" transmission regime established to fulfill the promise

(Dec. 9, 1997) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). See also Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225
F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff'dsub nom. New Yorkv. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
" Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by
Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,689.
1 See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (Mar. 8, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35); see also Public Utility DistrictNo. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington v. FERC, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
" Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (Mar. 8, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt.
35)
9

6Id.

PJM INTERCONNECTION, INC., http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are/territory-served.aspx (last
visited Mar. 11, 2018).
98 Id.
" Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (Mar. 8, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt.
35)
o Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,775 (July 29, 2009)
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 300).
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of competition in wholesale markets for electric power. 101 The order also addressed regional
transmission planning and cost allocation for interstate transmission facilities. 102
Three developments, therefore i) congressional restructuring of the electric utility industry,
(ii) FERC deregulation of wholesale markets for electric power, and (iii) open access to
transmission facilities for electric power generated by generation-only companies have all, in
effect, replaced regulation with competition in wholesale markets for electric power. Although
competition theoretically translates to lower prices in free market economies, this competition has
had an environmental impact on low-income communities. The consequences of that
environmental impact must be studied and analyzed.
PART

II: ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT OF RESTRUCTURING AND DEREGULATION

The replacement of regulation with competition in wholesale markets for electric power
undoubtedly has had an impact on prices for electric power. 103 It also undoubtedly has had an
impact on the environment. Competition in wholesale markets for electric power means that
participants in those markets will struggle to produce the cheapest, and thus the most competitive,
electric power. And the cheapest power will be the power that is generated by the cheapest fuel for
electric power plants be it coal, natural gas, nuclear, hydroelectric or other renewable resources.
The electric utility industry uses the foregoing fuels to generate electric power. The precise extent
to which each fuel is used to generate a share of the total electric power generated in the U.S. is
called the "fuel mix."1 04
A.

Impact on Fuel Mix

Competition in wholesale markets for electric power, independent power production, open
access, and market-based rates have resulted in significant changes in the generation of electric
power. Specifically, they have increased the demand for cheap fuels to generate electric power.
The use of cheap fuels for the generation of, for example, coal and nuclear, have significant
environmental consequences.
Coal-burning power plants emit a variety of air pollutants that endanger public health and
produce smog. They also emit carbon dioxide, a long-lived greenhouse gas that contributes to
global warming, climate change, and ocean acidification. Those power plants also emit toxic

101 Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,265 (Mar. 15,
2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35, 37).
102 See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities,
77 Fed. Reg. 32,183 (May 31, 2012) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); see S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d
41 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
103 The precise extent of that impact is beyond the scope of this article.
104 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=13731 (last visited Mar.
12, 2018); see, e.g., Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia, Bi-Annual Report on Fuel Mix 1 (July
3,2017).
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chemicals, e.g., mercury, which have considerable adverse health effects. Nuclear power plants do
not emit air pollutants but pose an inherent risk of environmental contamination in the event of a
power plant accident (e.g., Fukushima and Chernobyl),10 Those power plants also generate waste
that can remain radioactive and pose a health hazard for thousands of years. Cheap electric power
requires cheap fuels, but cheap fuels have environmental consequences.
The cost of electric power generation includes capital costs (e.g., the cost of a power plant), as
well as operating costs (e.g., the cost of the fuel used in the plant). After the plant is paid for, the
principal cost of electric power generation is the cost of the fuel it uses. To measure the relative
costs of different power plant fuels, the Energy Information Administration ("EIA") within the
U.S. Department of Energy publishes comprehensive data on the cost of coal and natural gas (fossil
fuels),106 and on the relative cost of each power plants' fuel per generation of kilowatt hour (kwh)
of electric power. 107 Recent EIA data on the cost of coal and natural gas, and on the relative cost
of each power plant fuel, is set forth in the following tables: 108

Fuel
Coal
Natural Gas
Fuel
Hydroelectric
Nuclear
Fossil

2005
Dollarspre MMtu
1.54
8.21
2005
Cents per kwh
0.67
1.82
2.79

Fuel
Coal
Natural Gas
Fuel
Hydroelectric
Nuclear
Fossil

2017
Dollarsper MMtu
2.06
3.37
2017
Cents per kwh
1.03
2.44
3.54

The cost of power generation also includes the costs associated with environmental
compliance.109 Some coal-burning power plants' emissions can be reduced with pollution control
technologies. Moreover, the choice of fuel may not be a pure economic decision; state policies
may require the use of alternative, renewable fuels. Finally, the ability of the fuel source to generate
electric power reliably must be considered. Coal-burning power plants can operate twenty-four
hours a day, seven days a week, but wind and solar power are unreliable, due to the fluctuating
nature of wind and sun. In competitive wholesale markets for electric power, however, nuclear and

15 See Georg Steinhauser et al., Comparison of the Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear accidents:
A review
of the environmentalimpacts, 487 SCI OF THE TOTAL ENV'T 575 (2014).
106 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T. OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2015, 145 (Table 7.4) (2016);

U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T. OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2017, Table 7.4 (2018). MMBtu, or one

million British thermal units, is a standard measure of the amount of heat energy in fossil fuels.
107 Id. at 171 (Table 8.4); One mill (derived from "millage" or the Latin term for "thousandth") is the
equivalent of 1/1,000th of one U.S. dollar or 1/10th of one U.S. cent. Thus 13.4 mills, for example, equal 1.34 cents.
108 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T. OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL YEAR?
1o Id.
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coal both inexpensive and reliable fuels with which to generate electric power will be the fuels
of choice.

,

The EIA collects data on the total amount of electric power generated in the U.S. by each fuel
source. In the past decade, natural gas has become a cheap fuel source for electric power
generation. Due to the increased availability of natural gas from relatively new technologies used
to recover it from underground rock formations, the cost of natural gas-generated electric power
has decreased dramatically. 10 As a result, electric power generated by both renewables and natural
gas have steadily increased; electric power generated by coal has steadily decreased; and power
generated by nuclear and hydroelectric have remained steady.

2007
Fuel
Coal
Natural Gas
Nuclear
Hydroelectric

2016
ThousandMWH
2,016,456
896,590
806,425
247,510

Fuel
Coal
Natural Gas
Nuclear
Hydroelectric

Conventional

Renewables

Thousand MWH
1,240,108
1,380,295
805,327
265,829

Conventional

104,626

Renewables

306,861

Ironically, in the 1970s, long before new technologies to recover natural gas were developed,
natural gas was thought to be so scarce that its use for electric power generation was largely
prohibited and reserved for home heating.112
But setting aside environmental considerations and cost externalities-such as, the cost of
pollution control technologies to reduce coal-burning power plant emissions-coal and nuclear
produce reliable, cheap, and competitive electric power. And despite dramatic decreases in the cost
of natural gas-generated electric power, coal is still a cheaper fuel source compared to natural
gas.113 In competitive markets for wholesale electric power, the market thus depends more and
more on existing coal and nuclear plants, whose useful lives continue to be extended through
aggressive maintenance and improved pollution control technologies. 114

o U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T. OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWERANNUAL 2017 Table 7.4 (2018).
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T. OF ENERGY, NET GENERATION BY ENERGY SOURCE: TOTAL (ALL

SECTORS) 2007-MARCH2017, ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY, MAY 2017, at 15; ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2017, supra

note 68, TABLE3.1.A.
"2 Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (1978).
113 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, supranote 68, TABLE 8.4.
114 See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, Power Plants Seek o Extend Life of NuclearReactors for Decades, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/business/power-plants-seek-to-extend-life-of-nuclearreactors.html.
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Although the use of natural gas to fuel electric power plants exceeded the use of coal in 2016,
the politics of coal and environmental regulation make it clear that coal-generated electric power
might make a "comeback" in the near future and once again become the principal fuel for electric
power generation.115 Moreover, concerns with greenhouse gases may precipitate a "comeback" for
nuclear power.116 Recently, for example, Microsoft founder and billionaire philanthropist Bill
Gates lobbied Congress in favor of nuclear power.117
For the past three decades, Congress and FERC have sought to introduce competition in
wholesale markets for electric power. Competition in those markets means that participants in
those markets will struggle to produce the most reliable and cheapest, and therefore, most
competitive, electric power. The most reliable and inexpensive power will continue to be generated
by coal and nuclear.
In non-competitive markets for wholesale electric power, in which cost-based ratemaking
determines the price of electric power, the use of cheap fuels for generation of power was not
critical. Vertically-integrated electric utilities with cost-based rates were guaranteed to recover
their costs for fuel, cheap or otherwise. The sole consideration in non-competitive markets is
reliable electric power. In today's competitive markets, cheap and reliable electric power is
paramount. Cheap electric power requires cheap fuels, e.g., coal and nuclear, but the use of cheap
fuels has environmental consequences, e.g., air pollution and other risks of environmental
contamination.
B.

Fuel Mix andLow-Income Communities

Electric power generation has always had a disproportionately adverse impact on low-income
communities. Increased dependence on coal and nuclear plants, resulting from electric utility
industry restructuring and deregulation, is certain to increase that adverse impact. The precise
extent of that impact is not known, because FERC has never analyzed the impact of its actions to
deregulate and promote competition in accordance with Executive Order 12,898.11"
According to the Energy Justice Network, coal-burning power plants disproportionately affect
African-American communities.11 9 Sixty-eight percent of African-Americans live within thirty
miles of a coal-buming power plant.120 Health-threatening coal-buming power plant emissions
"' See, e.g., Brady Dennis, Trump Administration Halts Obama-Era Rule Aimed at Curbing Toxic
Wastewater from Coal Plants, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2017/04/13/trump-administration-halts-obama-era-rule-aimed-at-curbing-toxic-wastewater-fromcoal-plants/?utm_term=.d9d6503aa72a.
116 See, e.g., Steven Mufson, Bill gates is here to sell you on nuclear, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2019, G1.
117 Id.
11' Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
119
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available

at

have the most significant adverse impact within a thirty-mile radius.1 " By contrast, fifty-six
percent of the white population lives within thirty miles of such a plant.1 2 Coal mining, moreover,
disproportionately affects low-income rural communities in Appalachia, where surface mining
destroys mountain tops and leaves coal waste strewn about in valleys and streams.123
Nuclear power also disproportionately affects low-income communities. Nuclear power plants
emit no air pollutants, but generate high-level radioactive waste, which remains radioactive for
thousands of years, as well as low-level radioactive waste, which is less dangerous. For decades,
pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the U.S. has sought to dispose of high-level
radioactive waste in a safe, scientifically-suitable underground waste disposal repository.124 Thirty
years ago, a suitable site - Yucca Mountain - was identified north of Las Vegas,12 ' but it has
proven to be politically impossible to site a repository near Sin City.126

In 1992, recognizing the political difficulties in siting a permanent repository in a U.S. state,
the U.S. Department of Energy ("DOE") proposed to negotiate agreements with quasi-sovereign
Native American tribes for the "temporary" storage of high-level radioactive waste on Native
12
American lands.m
The proposal, the American Indian Law Review observed, "builds on a long
history of radioactive activities in Indian country and the loophole of tribal sovereignty" and "is
based on past and current federal Indian policy and the socioeconomic conditions of the reservation
system."m128

In 1997, in response to the DOE proposal, the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians agreed to
store 40,000 metric tons of waste on its 118,000-acre reservation in Utah 129 In 2006, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission ("NRC") licensed the proposed storage facility, in exchange for which
the Goshutes would receive an undisclosed amount of money.13 However, political opposition
and legal challenges from environmentalists, the State of Utah, and the U.S. Department of the
Interior ultimately derailed the project.131

121
122

Id.
Id.

123Id.
124
121
126

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1982).
See 42 U.S.C. § 10172.
See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-1 1-229, COMMERCLL NUCLEAR

WASTE: EFFECTS OF A

TERMINATION OF THE YUCCA MOUNTAINREPOSITORYPROGRAMANDLESSONSLEARNED 34 (Apr. 2011).
127 See, e.g., Jon D. Erickson, et al., MonitoredRetrievableStorage ofSpent NuclearFuelin Indian Country:

Liability, Sovereignty, and Socioeconomics, 19 AM. INDIAN L. R. 78-82 (1992).
121 Id. at 82.
121 See, e.g., Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Michael 0. Leavitt, 215 F.Supp. 2d 1232, 1238-39 (D.
Utah 2002); See also William Claiborne, Utah ResistingTribe's NuclearDump; On a Reservation Ringed by Hazards,
Indians See Jobs, Money in Radioactive Rods, WASH. POST, Mar. 2,1999, A3.
13o Shanker Vedantam, StoragePlan Approvedfor Nuclear Waste; Government Gives Go-AheadforFacility
on Native American Land in Utah, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2005, A2.
131 See, e.g., Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Davis, 728 F.Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Utah 2010).
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Low-level radioactive waste, which is generated by nuclear power plants as well as by medical,
industrial, and research activities, is buried in shallow trenches. 132 For years, much of the waste
generated in the U.S. was buried in Barnwell County, South Carolina, which opened a disposal
site in 1969.133 Forty-four percent of the population of Barnwell County is African-American, and
twenty-five percent of the population lives below the poverty line. 134 Recognizing the injustice of
exporting so much waste to South Carolina, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act in 1980 ("LLRWPA") 13 That legislation required the development of additional waste
sites throughout the U.S. 136 Despite the good intentions of Congress, just one new disposal site
has opened since the enactment of the LLRWPA 13 Barnwell County is now one of only three
disposal sites in the U.S. for low-level radioactive waste. 13 Until 2008, it disposed of the waste
generated in thirty-nine states. 139 The disposal of the waste generated revenue for the State of South
Carolina that was used to fund education. 140 Most of the nation's most radioactive waste (Class B
and Class C low-level radioactive waste) is buried in Barnwell County. 141
When it deregulated the electric utility industry, FERC acknowledged, but did not analyze, the
likely increase in coal and nuclear power production, as well as the corresponding increase in
adverse environmental consequences. Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"),142 FERC prepared an environmental impact statement ("EIS") for Order No. 888.143
FERC discussed the impact of "open access" on coal-fueled generation and clean air, ignored the
impact on nuclear generation, and ultimately concluded that, because it regulated electric utilities
and not clean air, it was not required to mitigate the adverse environmental consequences of Order
No. 888.
We are, in essence and by law, economic regulators. While we have an obligation
under NEPA to take the environmental consequences of our actions into account in
112 See, e.g., MARK HOLT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,RL33461, CIVILIAN NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL
11-12,

31, 39-40 (2017).
133

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-604, Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE: DISPOSAL

AVAILABILITY ADEQUATE IN THE SHORT TERM, BUT OVERSIGHT NEED TO IDENTIFY ANY FUTURE SHORTFALLS 28-31

(June 2004).
134 CUBIT PLANNING, INC., www.southcarolina-demographics.com/barnwell-county-demographics
visited Mar. 13, 2018).
1 Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1980).
136 42 U.S.C. § 2021d (2009).

(last

137 HOLT, supra note 132, at 11-12.
138 Id.
139 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supranote
141 Id. at 29-30.
141

133, at 4-7, 10.

See, e.g., U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-221, Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

MANAGEMENT: APPROACHES USED BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES MAY PROVIDE USEFUL LESSONS FOR MANAGING U.S.

RADIOACTIVE WASTE 69, 74 (Mar. 2007)(in June 2004, 99% of Class B and Class C low-level radioactive waste

buried in Barnwell County).
142 See generallyNational Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012).
143 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services By
Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg 21,540 (May
10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385).
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fashioning our decision - and we have done so - NEPA grants us no new regulatory
powers. While NEPA extends our general obligation to engage in reasoned decision
making to include the consideration of possible environmental consequences of our
actions, it compels no particular substantive result.144
Several issues were addressed in the EIS, though the principal issue analyzed was the concern
that "competitive market conditions created by [Order No. 888] will provide an advantage to power
suppliers who produce power from coal-fired facilities." 1 45 A competitive advantage for coal-fired
facilities would mean more sales and generation of coal-fired electric power, increasing the
adverse environmental consequences of coal-fired electric power. Relative to coal-fueled
generation and clean air, FERC stated that the environmental impact of Order No. 888 would
depend on the price of natural gas versus the price of coal. 146 If coal were cheaper than natural gas,
then the anticipated increase in coal-fueled generation could "affect air quality slightly, if at all."147
Although FERC did not analyze the likely increase in coal and nuclear power production, nor
the corresponding increase in adverse environmental consequences due to electric utility
deregulation, some analysis since Order No. 888 has confirmed that increase. 148 For example,
Resources for the Future analyzed the increased dependence on coal and nuclear plants. 149 The
organization reported that "the average capacity factor for the entire fleet of coal-fired generators
in the United States rose from roughly 60% in 1992 to 70% in 2002."i1o In other words, the average
power plant designed to generate 1000 MW of electric power increased its actual generation of
electric power from 600 MW to 700 MW. Existing coal-fired power plants generated more electric
power and thus emitted more health-threatening air pollutants.151 "Moreover, the rate of increase
rose after 1995, coincident with the genesis of restructuring activity at FERC."
The increased dependence on nuclear plants due to restructuring and deregulation was even
more striking:
One of the unexpected consequences of electricity restructuring and greater
competition in wholesale electricity markets is the substantial improvement in
performance at the nation's nuclear plants. Contrary to predictions that many
nuclear plants were at risk of retiring prior to their license expiration as a result of

Id. at 21,672.
Id. at 21,670.
146 Id. at 21,671-73.
147 Id. at 21,672.
148 See, e.g., Karen Palmer & Dallas Burtraw, The Environmental Impacts of Electricity Restructuring:
Looking Back and Looking Forward 15, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, RFF DP 05-07 (2005),
http://www.rff org/files/sharepoint/Worklmages/Download/RFF-DP-05-07.pdf
149 Id.
144
145

1o Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
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competitive pricing of electricity, nuclear units, for the most part, have thrived
under competition.5
The organization explained that in the absence of cost-of-service ratemaking, there are financial
incentives for more efficient nuclear power production: "under cost-of-service regulation,
incentives to increase productivity at nuclear plants were much more muted, since revenues were
a function of cost."1 5 4 Market-based rates for electric power have resulted in more sales of nuclear
power, more generation of nuclear power, and consequently, the production of more high-level
and low-level radioactive waste.
Thus, restructuring and deregulation have resulted in an increased dependence on coal-fired
electric power and nuclear power, as well as an increase in the adverse environmental
consequences of those fuel sources. In addition, restructuring and deregulation (which include
open access to transmission facilities) allow for coal-fired electric power and nuclear power to be
sold to distant electric utilities. Those utilities can purchase electric power that is generated far
from their consumers. When electric utilities purchase power generated far from their consumers,
they are, in effect, exporting the adverse environmental consequences associated with the
generation of that electric power.
Prior to the restructuring and deregulation of the electric industry, when franchised, verticallyintegrated electric utilities generated their power and could not import electric power from
elsewhere, power plants were located near the communities served by those electric utilities. For
example, PEPCO once provided D.C. region with electric power from four coal plants located in
the region. 155
Today, due to competition, independent power production, transmission open access, and
market-based rates for electric power, affluent communities can import coal-fired electric power
and nuclear power from elsewhere and, in effect, outsource power generation to power plants
located elsewhere, e.g., to the coal-fired power plants near which many African-Americans live.156
Indeed, today PEPCO can provide the Washington, D.C. region with electric power not from coalfired power plants located along the Potomac River, but from coal plants located in West Virginia
and Pennsylvania, and from nuclear plants in Illinois.
1.

Potomac River GeneratingStation

On October 1, 2012, the Potomac River Generating Station, located in Alexandria, Virginia,
along the banks of the Potomac River, was permanently closed. 15 For over sixty years, the plant
15
114

Id. at 16.

Id. at 17.
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had provided PEPCO with electric power to sell to consumers in the D.C. region. PEPCO had built
the plant in 1949 but sold it in 2000.15 Nonetheless, the plant continued to sell wholesale electric
power to the regional electric utility.
PEPCO greatly relied upon the power plant. Indeed, when the Commonwealth of Virginia
closed the plant for Clear Air Act violations in 2005, PEPCO and the D.C. Public Service
Commission ("DCPSC") secured from the DOE, under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act,160
an "emergency order" to keep the plant open,161 Pepco and the DCPSC convinced the DOE that
the reliability of electric service in the D.C. region was at stake.
The City of Alexandria had sought the closure of the ash-spewing power plant for years. In
November 2004, it voted to revoke the municipal permit to operate the power plant.,16 In an
ensuing lawsuit, a state court held that the revocation of the municipal permit was invalid, and the
Virginia Supreme Court agreed that the revocation "impaired an established vested right to operate
the Plant." 163 Local opposition to the operation of the plant attracted considerable media attention.
Local opposition, however, did not close the Potomac River power plant. In fact, its owners
closed the plant only after a new high-voltage transmission line was built from West Virginia to
the D.C. region. 164 The new power line ensured that PEPCO could import reliable coal-generated
electric power from West Virginia and Pennsylvania. 65 The menace to clean air along the Potomac
River could be closed permanently.
The power line, the Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line (TrAIL) was built, with the approval of
PJM Interconnection, Inc. (PJM), for the express purpose of importing coal-generated electric
power to the power-starved D.C region.166 Despite considerable environmental opposition to
TrAIL, PJM (and the D.C. region) preferred the power line rather than the construction of new
power plants along the Potomac River. Even the Washington Post, in an editorial, endorsed the
project.167 The editorial acknowledged that the transmission line "places the burden for energy
production in western Pennsylvania and the Midwest." 68 The Washington Post opined that, even

Potomac Elec. Power Co., 93 FERC 1 61,240 (2000).
Leef Smith, MirantPower Plant to Close Temporarily, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2005, at Bl.
161 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c) (2012).
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(Dec.
20,
2005),
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/mirant_122005_2.pdf.
162 See Council Votes Against Mirant, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2004, at T04.
163 Alexandria City Councilv. MirantPotomac River, LLC, 643 S.E.2d 203, 204 (Va. 2007).
164 James W. Moeller, Clean Air v. Electric Reliability: The Case of the Potomac River
GeneratingStation,
5 WASH. &LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE &ENV'T 27, 75-81 (2013).
165 Id.
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Virginia Hits a Snag, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2008, at A14.
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with conservation and renewables, there was a need for imports of coal-generated electric power
to avoid blackouts in the D.C. region.169
TrAIL would traverse Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Virginia. Thus, it would require FERC
approval, as well as approval from the state public service commission in those three states. After
extended litigation, all three states ultimately approved the transmission line, despite the fact that
electric power transmitted over the power line would serve the D.C. region - not Pennsylvania,
West Virginia, or Virginia. 17 0
Initially, however, Pennsylvania balked. Its state commission objected that "the true impetus
for [TrAIL] is to transport cheaper coal-fired generation from western PJM to eastern PJM and to
encourage the siting of new generation in western PJM where it may be more palatable."
Ultimately, however, Pennsylvania was persuaded that the transmission line was in the interest of
PJM-wide electric reliability.171
TrAIL allows PEPCO to import cheap and reliable electric power generated by coal-fired
power plants located far from the high-income communities that PEPCO serves, but near which,
statistically, sixty-eight percent of African-Americans live.172 TrAIL also allowed the affluent
town of Alexandria, Virginia to force the shutdown of an ash-spewing, health-threatening eyesore
along its waterfront. Moreover, TrAIL will encourage the construction of new coal-fired power
plants in Western PJM, where the rural low-income communities of Appalachia are located, and
where coal-fired electric power "may be more palatable." 173
2.

Exelon Acquisition ofPEPCO

The repeal of PUHCA permitted Chicago-based Exelon to acquire PEPCO in 2015.
Additionally, open access to transmission facilities - and the construction of TrAIL --has opened
the door for the sale of Midwest-generated nuclear power to the D.C. region,174 which, in 1977,
had decided not to construct a nuclear power plant along the banks of the Potomac River.175
169 Id.

Moeller, supra note 166 at 126-39.
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Exelon owns sixteen nuclear power plants in Illinois, Pennsylvania, New York, and New
Jersey. 1 6 Most of those plants are in northeastern Illinois,177 which is part of PJM. Exelon is the
largest nuclear utility in the U.S. 17 In 2012, Exelon acquired Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.,
17
including the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant.m
In 2014, Exelon proposed to acquire PEPCO, a "wires-only" electric utility that generates none
of the electric power it sells to consumers in its franchised service territories, for $6.8 billion. 180

On June 18, 2014, Exelon and PEPCO filed an application with the DCPSC for approval of the
acquisition 8 The DCPSC held a hearing on the application in April 2015.18 There was
considerable local and environmental opposition to the proposed purchase of PEPCO by a nuclear
utility." Initially, the DCPSC unanimously rejected the proposed acquisition, concluding that the
proposed acquisition, 184 on the whole, would not benefit District consumers and therefore would
not be in the public interest.,1 5
Exelon and PEPCO thereafter negotiated a proposed settlement agreement with the local and
environmental opposition,18 6 which was rejected by the DCPSC in February 2016.187 However, in
March 2016, the commission approved a proposed revised settlement agreement Under the
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settlement agreement, the DCPSC can require Exelon to divest PEPCO in the event of a major
accident at a Midwestern Exelon nuclear power plant.1 9
In 1977, the public rejected PEPCO's proposal to construct a nuclear power plant on the banks
of the Potomac River. 190 The potential for contamination from a nuclear power plant accident along
the river was an unacceptable risk despite the promise of cheap and reliable electric power. 191In
2016, the DCPSC approved Exelon's purchase of PEPCO and thus opened the door to PEPCO
purchases of wholesale nuclear power generated by Exelon in the Midwest
After that approval, the Chairman of the DCPSC, who voted against the approval, commented
that, prior to the merger, a "wires-only" PEPCO had no "financial interest" regarding the source
of its wholesale power purchases; after the merger, "now [an Exelon-owned PEPCO] will" have a
"financial interest" in purchasing wholesale nuclear power from Exelon 192
Indeed, according to Public Citizen, a nonprofit consumer rights advocacy group, 193 "Exelon
will want ratepayers to ultimately consume electricity generated by centralized, Exelon-owned
power plants." 194 Should PEPCO purchase power from Exelon, the District will receive the
benefits of cheap and reliable nuclear power but will face none of the risks.
C.

FERC, Fuel Mix, andEnvironmentalJustice

Merchant power plants, competition in wholesale markets for electric power, open access, and
market-based rates have necessitated the expanded use of cheap fuels for power generation.
Consequently, the increased dependence on coal and nuclear plants for the generation of wholesale
electric power has significant environmental consequences, e.g., health-threatening air pollution
near coal-burning power plants and the risk of environmental contamination due to nuclear power
plant accidents.
Sixty-eight percent-of African Americans live within thirty miles of a coal-fired power plant. 195
Coal-fired power plants emit health-threatening pollutants, and due to restructuring and
deregulation, those plants are generating even more electric power and are thus emitting even more
pollutants. Some of that additional electric power is exported to distant communities that have no
power plants of their own. Thus, restructuring and deregulation pose increased health hazards to
1'
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those African-American communities near coal-fired power plants. Consequentially, restructuring
and deregulation result in decreased health hazards for communities, like the affluent
neighborhoods served by PEPCO, that import coal-fired electric power from distant power plants.
Furthermore, generating more electric power requires more coal mining, which scars the
landscapes of rural Appalachia.
Given the increased dependence on coal-fired electric power and nuclear power, inferences
can be drawn from the fact that sixty-eight percent of African Americans live within thirty miles
of a coal-fired power plant. The actual impact of electric utility restructuring and deregulation on
low-income communities, however, has not been acknowledged, let alone studied, analyzed, and
quantified. Despite the plain language of Executive Order 12,898, FERC insists that it is not subject
to the executive order. Thus, FERC has ignored the environmental impact of electric utility
restructuring and deregulation on low-income communities.
On February 11, 1994, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12,898 ("EO"), Federal
Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations.196 The EO requires all federal agencies to make environmental justice a part of their
mission "by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations
and low-income populations . . . "197 Each agency must also develop an environmental justice
strategy that "identifies and addresses disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and lowincome populations." 1 98
The EO reflects the law of environmental justice, which is rooted in constitutional law. 199 The
law is based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.200 The law also finds support in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.201 Title VI
prohibits discrimination in programs that receive federal financial assistance. 202 The law has been
used to remediate abandoned or inactive contaminated sites, to recycle brownfield sites, to control
the operation of existing facilities, and to halt the construction of new facilities. 203 "A central claim
of the environmental justice movement has been that hazardous facilities are disproportionately
located in low-income communities, and a focus of the movement's activities has been to prevent
new facilities from being built." 204
Federal Actions To Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,
Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
196
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Contrary to the plain language of the executive order, FERC has stated it is not bound by the
EO's requirements. 205 "Executive Order 12898 applies only to the federal agencies named in
section 1-102 of that order, and the Commission is not among those named agencies. Independent
agencies, such as this Commission, are requested to but not compelled to comply with the
provisions of the order." 206
The agencies listed in Section 1-102 are the agencies included in an Interagency Working
Group on Environmental Justice. 207 Because FERC is not specifically included in that list, it
reasons that it is not required to implement the EO. 20 Of course, the Working Group includes the
DOE, and FERC actually is part of DOE.209
Thus, according to the commission, FERC is not required to identify and address any
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs,
policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations.
And although it is bound by NEPA,210 the commission has stated that, while it must consider
the environmental consequences of its actions, it need not address or mitigate them. 211 As it stated
in its EIS for Order 888, "Iwle are, in essence and by law, economic regulators.... NEPA grants
us no new regulatory powers."212
CONCLUSION

Traditionally, electric utilities were vertically-integrated companies that owned assets for the
generation, transmission, and distribution of electric power. Those generation assets the electric
power plants and their associated adverse environmental consequences were located near the
consumers that those electric utilities served. Public utility holding companies could own several
electric utilities if those utilities were geographically contiguous and economically integrated. The
rates charged by electric utilities for electric power were regulated and subject to cost-of-service
ratemaking. Under such ratemaking, there was no economic incentive to minimize the costs
associated with electric power generation, e.g., the costs of fuels to generate electric power.
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Due to decades of congressional and FERC restructuring and deregulation, and due to the
advent of independent power production, merchant power plants, deregulation of wholesale
markets for electric power, market-based rates, open access to transmission facilities, and
competitive markets for electric powerhere is now a particular need to use cheap fuels for power
generation. Those cheap fuels include coal and nuclear. Consequently, restructuring and
deregulation have increased market dependence on coal-fired generation and nuclear power. This
increased dependence has resulted in a corresponding increase in the health-threatening
environmental consequences of coal-fired generation and nuclear power. Those consequences
have a disproportionately adverse effect on low-income communities (e.g., the sixty-eight percent
of African Americans who live within thirty miles of a coal-fired power plant and the poor rural
communities in Appalachia where coal is mined).
Moreover, independent power production and open access mean that electric companies do not
need to own electric power plants located near their consumers. Those utilities, like PEPCO, can
now purchase their electric power from coal-fired and nuclear power plants located far away from
the affluent communities that the utilities serve.
But the precise extent of the impact of electric utility restructuring and deregulation on lowincome communities has not been assessed. What is the precise increase in the generation of cheap
coal-fired electric power and nuclear power attributable to restructuring and deregulation? What
are the quantifiable environmental consequences of that increase? In which communities have
power plants increased production of electric power? What are the demographics of those
communities? In which communities, like the District, have power plants been closed because
power is available elsewhere? What are the demographics of those communities? Where are new
coal-fired and nuclear merchant plants proposed to be built? What are the demographics of those
communities?
These questions necessitate the type of analysis required under Executive Order 12,898.
Despite the plain language of the executive order, however, FERC has abdicated its responsibility
to assess the environmental impact on low-income communities as a result of that restructuring
and deregulation. Yet, if the experience of PEPCO is any indication, affluent communities, because
of restructuring and deregulation, can close their own coal-fired power plants, eliminate the
adverse environmental consequences of those plants for their communities, import reliable, cheap
coal and nuclear-generated electric power, and thus, in effect, export the environmental
consequences of that electric power to other, statistically low-income communities. This scenario
illustrates the need for an Executive Order 12,898 analysis of electric utility industry restructuring
and deregulation.
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